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1 Introduction
My interest in the issue of power started when I was
studying Marx and his analyses of class-based power
relations. However, I never felt that to look at class
alone was satisfactory, especially in today’s global
context, where class has lost its organisational salience.
Searching for a dimension of power where I could feel
more personally involved, I found myself turning to
gender-based power relations. This seemed not only
to be a set of relations that directly touched my own
life, since as a woman I belonged in the lower power
position but deeper analysis convinced me that these
form the fundament of all power relations.
This is not to refuse to acknowledge the force of
oppression based on race, economic and educational
status, ethnic background, religion, age, class and
others, but rather to realise that all of these are
differentially experienced according to one’s sex. I do
not mean to imply that oppression based on gender is
stronger or more devastating than that based say, on
race, but rather that we need to bear in mind that
people’s experiences of racism are gendered, that men
and women are not regarded in the same way, nor
treated the same, in any social group, oppressed or
otherwise. Almost invariably, women find themselves
in a lower position than men of their own social
group and very often have to bear the brunt not just
of their own but also of men’s disenfranchisement
taken out on them through violence.
Since it has usually been men who have had the
power to articulate oppression, women’s often very
different experiences have largely been ignored and
thus generally remain unacknowledged. This may
help account for the fact that in civil rights and
nationalist struggles, women’s experiences tend to
be subsumed to those of men, with the result that
they may be expected to support their race or
nationality on men’s terms with their own
oppression taking a back seat.
Both men and women are expected to live up to
norms in the form of gender identities that
circumscribe the behaviour and self-presentation of
each sex within their particular social group and
which almost invariably give the upper power
position to men. This applies as much to the West,
where despite the struggles of the last few decades,
gender-based power differences are still clearly
visible, as to the South.
This notwithstanding, women are a great deal more
powerful than the norms imply. However, their
power is not acknowledged in public discourse and
that puts limitations on their capacity to exercise it,
as I shall argue below.
One of the reasons for the failure to achieve equality
between the sexes is a continued refusal to engage
with the issue of men as gendered beings rather
than as representatives of some putative human
norm. In the post-enlightenment world view, the
West still holds up as ideal; this norm is seen as
disembodied and rational and thus the opposite of
the supposedly emotional female, firmly grounded in
her body. Regarding men as embodiments of often
highly emotional masculinity would destroy this
conceptual framework and with it the entrenched
notions that men are better fitted to be leaders in
politics and business. This is, I believe, an important
factor in the strong resistance to the idea of
deconstructing the male in development theory and
thus is one reason why development practice has
avoided working with men as gendered, as opposed
to normative, beings (see Scott 1995).
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In many of today’s development strategies that focus
on the most vulnerable, usually seen as women
and/or children, men are seen as privileged and thus
unfit for serious concern. If they are addressed at all
in development projects this is usually as ungendered
norms in their roles as heads of household or
workers, but never like women as gendered beings,
and rarely as those responsible for family-related
issues such as birth control.
This may be partly because development theory does
not connect men with families as it does women.
While many countries have ministries of women and
children or women and the family, nowhere is there
a ministry of men, women and the family; the phrase
fathers and children is rarely heard.
Moreover, today’s community-level development
paradigms tend to work through those in lower
power positions – those whom Robert Chambers
(this IDS Bulletin) refers to as lowers. With regard to
their families, adult men fill a position of uppers. And
thus, according to Chambers, they are less likely to
be addressed as capable of changing power relations.
Even work on violence against women has tended to
address women only, excluding men. This perhaps
accounts for the relatively small impact of so much
development work. My own work with men has
corroborated Chambers’ theory that working with
uppers on changing power relations can produce
highly positive results (e.g. Harris 2006b).
In other writings, I address the issue of how men
become vulnerable through attempting to live up to
norms of masculinity (Harris 2004, 2005b, 2006a).
Here, I discuss how directly addressing men as
gendered beings can benefit the entire community. I
do this through an analysis of a small development
intervention I carried out in a Malian village. Working
with the men enabled me in only a few hours to
make an impact that a year later still resonated
there. While this is unlikely to have made more than
very small inroads into gendered power imbalances
and the lack of ongoing contact almost certainly
means that the long-term effect was limited, it
nevertheless had a far greater impact than any I have
been able to produce working with women alone.
This is no doubt, as Chambers (this IDS Bulletin)
suggests, because changes in power relations are much
easier to make with the collaboration of the more
powerful – in this case men – and power shifts should
be the main production of development interventions,
dealing as they do with human relationships which are
always linked to issues of power. Since the overt power
in families resides with adult male heads of household,
helping them deconstruct masculinity is one approach
to producing power shifts and thus can be a potent
development tool, as this article shows.
I start by describing the intervention, after which I set
it within the context of masculinity and development
and subsequently analyse power relations both within
the village and between the community members
and the various development actors involved.
2 Family relations in a Malian village1
It is November 2001 and I have come to Mali on
behalf of the Integrated Pest Management
Collaborative Research Support Program’s (IPM CRSP)
project in partnership with the Malian governmental
Institut d’Economie Rurale (IER). This project is being
carried out in a number of villages just south of the
capital, Bamako, teaching agricultural skills to farmers.
The villagers are all Muslims and most men have two
or more wives living in the same homestead. While
couples in monogamous unions might pool their
income and use it for the family as a whole, women in
polygynous unions tend to handle their own money,
not to put it into a family pot, since they are unwilling
to allow their co-wives and the latter’s children to
share with them (Harris 2005a). Such women supply a
large part of their children’s economic needs, with
husbands who can afford it contributing cereals,
medical expenses and sometimes school fees.
My intention was to carry out gender training
exercises with both men and women in separate
groups in the village of Mororo, which I visited along
with a group of Malian IPM CRSP collaborators.2 We
started by asking each group to compile a list of
what they considered their most pressing problems.
For both sexes, the majority of issues revolved
around poverty, not only of individuals but of the
village as a whole. Apparently there were only two
men in the village able to earn sufficient to support
their families and this meant that only two families
out of 100 were able to meet their basic needs.
Traditionally, they all said, the men were expected to
give their wives money to buy food. The older men
had been able to do this reasonably well in their
youth and still saw this as a norm they were expected
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to live up to. The younger men, however, had not
even considered doing so. Since they were unable to
provide the entire sum, they had chosen not to give
their wives anything at all and simply expected them
somehow to find enough supplies to feed their
families. The women in fact all had earnings of their
own, which in the absence of sufficient contributions
from their husbands, they were forced to use for
food. This was never enough so that they all had to
be more careful about eating than in the past. This
also meant that the women often could not afford to
send their children to school. Many did not even have
adequate clothes or shoes to do so.
The problem was in part due to lower agricultural
productivity caused by drought, pests and illnesses
and dwindling soil fertility. The farmers had no
resources to buy fertiliser to compensate. In fact,
they had problems even to find enough seed to plant
each year and since they had no way of getting their
produce to market, were usually forced to sell it at
low prices to middlemen.
Another problem cited by both sexes was the
workload of the village women. They carried out
domestic tasks, were responsible for providing water
and cooking fuel, helped their husbands farm and
frequently farmed their own separate fields too. The
men claimed not to be able to help the women, even
with non-domestic tasks such as cutting and carrying
wood, since these had always been considered
women’s work. They did help their wives a little by
preparing and fertilising their fields but that was the
extent of it. They certainly did not make any
contribution to household labour. The men said that it
was out of the question to help with such tasks. If one
of their wives was away from home or sick, they would
find another woman – a co-wife, sister or mother, to
do the work if their daughters were too young.
The women further complained about their husbands’
lack of ability to meet their children’s needs. One
woman said there were no more than five families in
the village where men were capable of paying all their
children’s costs. In the rest of the families men’s
contributions varied from the majority of the costs
down to nothing at all, while even at the worst times
women somehow managed to find enough food to
prevent the family dying of starvation. This also
contributed to their exhaustion as they had to work
exceedingly hard in order to find enough cash to buy
food. One way of doing this was to go into the forest,
cut down a tree and sell the wood. It was very hard
work to get enough for cooking as well as for selling
but without any education or marketable skills they had
few alternatives.
In addition to their daily labours the women blamed
constant childbearing for their exhaustion. Their
husbands, they maintained, were absolutely against
any type of family planning and wanted as many
children as possible. One woman said she thought
they would have 50 if this were possible. She had had
three pairs of twins and was fed up with childbearing.
At the very least she wanted a few years’ rest before
having any more. This woman, together with a few of
her friends, begged me to discuss this with their
husbands, saying she thought the men might listen to
me even though they would not listen to them. 
With some trepidation, I agreed to speak with the
men. Sitting down with about ten of them, aged
between about 20 and 45, who had assembled in a
neighbouring courtyard, I broached the subject by
asking how many children they wanted. The men
shuffled around looking uncomfortable. After a few
minutes, one of them, whom I will call Cheick, spoke
up. He looked to be in his mid- to late-thirties and
was the most articulate. He asked me how many
children I thought they should have. I told them that I
did not think it was any of my business. The decision
was up to the families themselves. If they wanted 100
children each, that was fine by me. However, I was
interested to know what kinds of plans they made in
regard to the support of each successive child.
There was a shocked silence. What did she mean,
100 children, I could almost see them thinking.
Cheick rather carefully enquired what I was talking
about. I asked them to consider what a child might
need once it had been brought into the world. They
hesitatingly listed food, clothes, medicines, and one
of them added schooling. Did they all have plenty of
resources to do this, I wanted to know? This brought
an instant reaction. No, they did not. They absolutely
did not have enough resources, not at all. They could
barely feed them. Clothing was a luxury (as I could
see for myself, many of the children and even some
of the men wore little better than rags) and school
was out of the question for most of the children. A
serious illness could be a complete disaster.
The conversation moved on to other topics. Cheick,
however, was no longer participating. He sat there
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apparently deep in thought for over half an hour.
Then, just as the session was winding down, he
spoke up. He informed us that he had always
planned on having 15 children. He did not mean to
put such a burden on one wife but rather planned to
have five children each with three different women
because he thought it was bad for one woman to
have more than five. So far he had only one wife,
with whom he already had five children, and he was
contemplating taking a second. When he was a child
he said, men did not have to think about family size.
Everyone had large families and all members
contributed their share of food. There was always
plenty of this, as there had been in his grandfather’s
compound where he grew up. His father was one of
15 children and all the sons had helped support their
parents, so that his grandparents had had an easy old
age. This was his dream and he had thought to
achieve it by having the same number of children.
In the past, said Cheick, small families were rarely
prosperous. Large numbers of children were
necessary to help with the labour. He had taken this
for granted. However, my questions had started him
considering the present situation.
When he was a boy the village was small. By 2001,
the number of inhabitants was much larger and
rapidly increasing. Thinking it over, he had realised
with a shock that it no longer made economic sense
for one man to have so many children. Before that
day’s discussion, he would have sworn the opposite,
especially since personally he loved children. However,
my questions had started him thinking. He was poor,
very poor. It was a struggle to support the children he
already had on his small share of land. With two
more wives and their children, he would actually be
poorer, not richer as he had previously assumed. He
had not considered the period between the children’s
birth and their being old enough to support him but
now he realised this was crucial. He would need to
support them for years before they would be able to
support him, if indeed they ever could.
Cheick finished his statement by declaring
vehemently that polygyny was a mistake. ‘We men,’
he said, ‘need to rethink the way we live. We should
start by abolishing polygyny.’ He continued by saying
that in today’s large families there were always some
children with health problems. It would be better to
have fewer but healthier children. He was now
determined, he said, to stick to his one wife and not
have any more children. Just then the women came
along, so the men’s session ended there.
I returned to Mororo in the summer of 2002. I first
met with the women and asked what had happened
since my last visit. Were there any changes? They
told me there was less illness in the village since we
had talked about the relationship between hygiene
and disease. For one thing, they had decided it was
important to keep the village clean and so every
Friday, the women would get together and sweep
the public areas. They also said their relations with
their husbands had improved. However, they did not
know whether their husbands had changed their
attitudes towards birth control because this was not
a subject easily discussed.
Only a few of the men from the previous occasion
were available but Cheick and several of his friends
came to talk to us. Cheick in particular was
enthusiastic at seeing me again. He told me that
ever since my previous visit, family size and birth
control had become important topics in the men’s
nightly discussions in the mosque, along with an
argument over which was preferable – polygyny or
monogamy. In fact, my visit had acted almost like a
bomb, he said. In other words, it had been a
significant catalyst for opinion change. When asked
to explain, he told us the following. Over the
previous five years, several non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) had come to talk about family
planning. The sessions had been like lectures and the
men were made to look stupid and inferior because
of their lack of technical knowledge and they were
treated as if they automatically opposed the use of
contraceptives. Because this offended them they had
paid little attention.
Then one day we arrived. In the first place we treated
them as human beings. We sat next to them on their
benches. Furthermore, we neither told them what to
do nor talked down to them. Rather, my questions
had encouraged them to think and reflect for
themselves. Afterwards, the group had described our
conversation to their comrades in the mosque, and
they had been so interested that the issues still
formed an important topic of conversation.
Cheick had neither married again nor had another
child and several other men also said they were now
using contraception. Another outcome had
apparently been that the men had started to talk
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more with their wives about important matters and
to include them in decision making, something
hitherto unheard of. Moreover, they claimed also to
consider their wives’ welfare more in regard to other
issues, such as granting them a plot for themselves
on the family land if they wanted. They had also
reduced the amount of work they expected their
wives to carry out on family land since, they said,
men could increase their agricultural labour without
risking a charge of effeminacy, which they could not
do with other types of work. The overall result had
been greater dialogue between spouses, enhanced
family relations and improved health for the women.
3 Men in development?
The issue of whether and how to include men in
development projects has recently started to receive
considerable attention from researchers on gender
and development (e.g. Cleaver 2002; Sweetman
2001a). Among the concerns raised is whether
focusing on men is not simply a return to privileging
them (Wassef 2001) and how far targeting men in
development projects removes scarce resources from
women-centred projects (Sweetman 2001b).
For a long time, men were viewed by those in
gender and development as the problem. They were
the ones holding women down, disempowering
them, beating them up and/or infecting them with
HIV. More recently, however, the study of men and
masculinities has allowed development theorists and
practitioners to acknowledge it is time to see men as
also often disadvantaged and to consider how they
might form part of the solution and not only of the
problem. What such development might look like
has recently been under discussion (e.g. Greig et al.
2000). A number of initiatives have brought men
into development (e.g. Kandirikirira 2002) but there
is still a long way to go in working out systematic
theoretical and practical approaches.
Gender analysis has consisted to a large extent of
considering the institutions and cultural practices
that keep women in a structurally inferior position to
members of the other sex with a view to seeing
how these can be transformed to produce greater
equity. This has tended to produce considerable
resistance among men, who feel threatened with
losing their power positions (Bhasin 2001).
Working with men on the difficulties they experience
in performing masculinity may seem like a way of
appealing to their self interest and reinforcing
unequal gendered power relations, rather than using
the opportunity to challenge their power over
women (Bujra and Baylies 2001). However, the ways
men often feel obliged to conceptualise and perform
masculinity make it difficult for them to behave in
ways that are empowering for women or even in
ways that would seem to be useful for men
themselves.
It has been demonstrated over and over, that
masculinity is constructed in apposition to femininity.
The masculine is viewed as powerful, strong and
superior. Men should be virile, breadwinners,
conquerors both of women and when necessary
other men (Barker 2005; Connell 1996). Masculinity
only exists in relation to a ritualised inferior femininity
(Harris 2004; 2006a) and demands ways of keeping
this femininity under control (Wassef 2001). In other
words, it is fear of emasculation that is responsible
for a great deal of men’s behaviour in regard to
domestic violence, multiple sex partners and other
risky behaviour, such as the refusal to use condoms.
Development discourse has moved beyond the idea
that men always use their superior power position to
the detriment of their womenfolk. It is now
admitted that even in the most disadvantaged
communities, some men seek other ways of living
(Barker 2005). There are many more who do not
intentionally use the power they have been granted
but who, because of the cultural patterns they were
raised in, have never thought about other ways of
behaving. It has simply not occurred to them to take
into account the feelings and desires of their wives,
daughters, or even sons.
Thus, Cheick and his friends were not all deliberate
and nasty oppressors. They had simply not been
raised to consider women’s needs. Moreover, they
had automatically followed the customs of their
forefathers without thinking about the effects of
recent political, economic and ecological changes.
Take the issue of polygyny raised by Cheick. In rural
Mali, as in many other African settings, polygynous
marriage enhances men’s status. It implies both a
superior power position vis-à-vis their wives and the
financial ability to maintain several women and their
children. As Cheick suggests, this institution is tied to
the concept that large families are the most
prosperous, something that applied when there was
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plenty of land and those with the largest families
were best situated to take advantage of this. Today
all the land belonging to Mororo has been allocated.3
Families have to make do with a much smaller plot
than before and often cannot farm all of it for lack
of water. Rather than too much land for a small
family to farm, there is now too little productive land
to feed a large one. The result is that while a man
might be able to pay for the expenses of marrying a
second wife, in the long term, the likelihood is that
this will make the family worse off than before
(Harris 2005a).
Cheick’s idea that it was a good idea in today’s
circumstances to stick to monogamy was
revolutionary since it would entail redefining
masculinity. This may appear to make sense, since
what he proposes could be regarded as constructing
a form of masculinity more congruent with the
current situation. However, since this will mean
redefining how men achieve status in such rural
settings where they have little else to base it on, it
may not be so easy for most to accept.
The impetus for Cheick’s thought processes that led
to his proposing monogamy was the questions raised
in our discussion. Had I or anyone else suggested that
monogamy would be a rational response to their
current difficulties, I have little doubt that Cheick,
along with his fellow villagers, would have summarily
rejected the idea. It was because he came to this
conclusion on his own that he saw it as logical and
accepted it as meaningful for him and his friends.4
Moreover, Cheick and the others had been brought
for the first time to consider consciously what it
meant to be men in their particular situation and
how as men, they could change their relationships
with their womenfolk. The idea of a group of
uneducated Muslim village men working through
concepts of masculinity and going on to use these
voluntarily to empower their own wives, to however
slight a degree, is truly revolutionary and all the
more so since we spent only a few hours in Mororo
and provided very limited training. It was the men
themselves who did the work. We had merely
served as a catalyst.
4 Power
Multiple levels of power relations emerge from this
story – between the women in the village and their
menfolk and between the community and the
various development agents who had visited the
village, including of course myself and my partners.
The relationship between the development agents
and the local population appeared to be extremely
hierarchical, with the NGOs apparently taking it for
granted that they had a right to enter a village and
lecture their ‘inferiors’.5 Cheick and his friends felt
strongly that they were being condescended to. They
felt unable to challenge the NGOs directly, since
their higher power position was too silencing, but
used their ‘weapons of the weak’ (Scott 1985) to do
so indirectly by taking minimal notice of what they
told them and expressing their resentment behind
the backs of these outsiders. Moreover, their very
refusal to conform to the behaviour changes the
NGO staff wished to impose upon them was a way
of tacitly refusing to accept the relations of power
over them they were unable to refuse explicitly.
In the case of my own visit to Mororo, I went as part
of a project that had been working in the villages for
some time and was accompanied by IER agents –
that is by government researchers – working on the
project. Several of the IER women insisted on
wearing their best clothes and eating separately
from the villagers. Unlike the village women, they
would sit on chairs and, although apparently friendly,
clearly distanced themselves from the community.
They were visibly shocked when I sat on the mats
with the women or on the benches side by side with
the men. It was impossible to bring them to admit
the importance of acknowledging the structural
power differentials between themselves and the
villagers, especially the village women, and explicitly
trying to break down the barriers these caused.
Of course, my sitting together with the villagers, as
also my deliberate choice of clothes similar in style
and quality to theirs, could not obviate the fact of my
positioning as an educated white woman, from the
viewpoint of the inhabitants of Mororo unimaginably
wealthy and equally unimaginably unconstrained by
the kinds of social control they are constantly subject
to, at community/family level as well as from the
government. My conscious attempt both to
acknowledge this gulf and to negate it, allowed me
to establish a warm relationship with the villagers, so
that they showed a certain level of acceptance.
However, it should also be said that it was easy for
me to acknowledge and deliberately try to minimise
the power differentials precisely because of the size
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of the gulf, which meant that I was in no way
threatened by doing so, and that my acknowledging
it could only permit me partially to overcome even
those barriers I was aware of. Of course there must
have been many which I was blind to.
I do not intend to imply that my personal relations
with the community were the main reason for their
responsiveness to our intervention. This, I believe,
was the result of our transformative learning
approach (see Harris 2006b). Nevertheless, the fact
that Cheick was able to articulate my attitude
towards him and his friends as contributory to the
success of our intervention shows that it had in itself
made a real impact, however illusory my attempt at
producing an appearance of equality may have been.
Moreover, the very fact that I came from a so-called
modern society as opposed to their traditionally
minded one, was in itself a kind of hierarchy, given
the attitude ‘modern equals superior’ that coexists in
Mali alongside the rejection of much of what
modernity stands for.
Thus, it could also be said that there are symbolic
power relations between the new ideas
encapsulated in the discourse of family planning –
that is, a discourse that arises out of modernity – and
the more traditional ideas espoused by the older
generation of villagers, such as Cheick’s
grandparents. A struggle for supremacy is being
played out between these different worldviews in a
setting where little of the modern can be seen.
Surface appearances at least would suggest that
there had been little change for decades, if not
centuries. Nevertheless, the very fact that family
planning is a familiar concept to all present indicates
direct contact with institutions of modernity, and the
willingness to consider using it points to the
inevitable socioeconomic changes that the
modernising force of globalisation has produced in
Mororo.
The gendered power relations that give men the say
in deciding whether or not a couple should use birth
control are a way of maintaining social order by
inculcating certain ways of doing and being from
birth. This is a kind of disciplining of the body, similar
but not identical, to what Foucault (1979) is talking
about in his discussion of European disciplinary
institutions or what Haugaard terms creating tacit
knowledge through motions of predictability
(2003: 106). Thus, female and male bodies are
expected from childhood to differ in the kinds of
movements they make, the way they occupy space
and express emotions, and the tasks they are trained
to carry out as a matter of routine. Gender is thus
not simply a black box of power differentials but
contains a rich conglomeration of characteristics and
roles assigned to one or the other sex within a
specific social group.
An important issue within all these power
relationships is the fact that the superior power
position is conferred upon the holders by the
community as a result of traditional methods of
maintaining social order. It is not intrinsic to the
people concerned (Haugaard 2003: 92). Thus, men’s
power over women is not directly, or indeed mainly,
due to biology – that is, their ability to use physical
force either on behalf of, or for controlling, their
womenfolk – but rather part of the social order,
accepted and thus confirmed by all concerned. It is
this that gives men power over their wives.6
Mali is a gerontocratic society. This means that in
effect older women gain power by virtue of their
age. This grants them control over their daughters-
in-law so that, although nobody in Mororo
specifically mentioned it, it is not only husbands but
also mothers-in-law who exercise control over
young women and their fertility. Moreover, mothers
have power over even adult sons.
Here we have a power relationship that is tacitly
confirmed by society but which actually contravenes
the discursively explicit gender relationships in which
men are supposed always to have power over
women. Public discourse on gender in gerontocratic
communities is silent on the fact that this power is in
fact given to older men over younger women and
not to all men over all women. In other words, in
Mali, the power of gerontocracy is greater than that
of gender in certain ways but this is not usually
articulated because men claim the upper hand in
relation to gender, even though their power is
mainly reduced to that over wives and daughters,
both of whom are usually younger than themselves.
Discursively, for instance, a woman cannot be a head
of household, which again obscures the fact that a
widow may have power over her adult son, since she
is not supposed to be able to maintain a household
without an adult male as at least a nominal head (see
Harris 2004).
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The silence of discourse on the issue of women’s
power over younger men is similar to the concept of
tacit or practical power relations discussed by
Haugaard (2003: 100) – power relations that serve
social order but which are not expressed discursively.
However, it should also be noted that this silence
serves to undermine women’s power, thus rendering
them less dangerous as power holders than they
might otherwise be. In other words, it tends to
weaken the ‘power to’ that women develop as they
age within a traditional context as mothers of sons
residing within their marital family, while leaving the
more problematic ‘power over’ in place.
Simultaneously, it places younger men in a difficult
situation. According to public discourse, they are
expected to act as dominant members of society but
they are hampered in this by the constraints on their
power vis-à-vis older women, particularly their
mothers and even grandmothers, as well as in
relation to older men. In order to feel powerful
despite their youth, young men may seek other ways
of exhibiting their masculinity and thereby displaying
a kind of ‘power to’, for instance through the
practice of violence in community conflict situations
or in relation to their wives and/or children, or by
engaging in sexual relations with multiple partners
and without a condom, as a proof of superior
strength. Such acts may be seen as defying women’s
power and perhaps also that of their fathers. It can
also be observed in many societies that the less
power men have outside the family (such as
economic, educational, employment-based or
political power), the more they feel inclined to exert
it within the family circle.7
In other words, we need to move beyond merely
observing that tacit power relations exist, to
considering which power relations are tacit, which
explicit and why. Haugaard (2003: 101) states that
once there is a change from tacit to explicit, this
allows actors to reject relations that are to their
disadvantage. This of course has been the point of
consciousness raising in civil rights’ movements,
including women’s movements.
However, as Foucault (1990: 101–102) points out,
another effect of making power relations discursively
explicit may be to reify and even solidify them. In
fact, this has happened around gender identities and
relations in settings such as Mali, where the
population has been exposed to outside pressures
from (neo)colonialism towards change and especially
towards the ‘emancipation’ of women. The
articulating of traditional gender power relations
that takes place here can be co-opted by local
communities and these relations turned into a means
of resistance, of refusal of change (cf. Harris 2004).
Thus, in Mali, as with most other Southern societies
where I have worked, the population openly
articulates, and in general supports, male superiority.
They can also list many significant components of
male and female roles, as they did in Mororo when
we looked at gender-specific tasks. They maintain
silence, however, on anything that appears to present
women in a higher and men in a lower position, such
as the gerontocratic positioning discussed above.
Such positioning tends to remain invisible even in
most social science representations of gender issues,
perhaps because the study of gender relations
emanated from a northern European/US perspective
– that is from non-gerontocratic societies – and this
has established a framework of binary power
relations between the sexes that continues to
influence research and conceptualisation on these
questions. Despite a recent growth in emphasis on
masculinities’ studies, the overwhelming majority of
gender work continues to concentrate on the fight
for female equality. The multiplicity and complexity of
gendered power relations tends therefore to be
ignored. So too does Foucault’s concept of the
micro-mechanisms of power and the way this
circulates through society, each pressure point
meeting with a certain level of resistance (1980:
94–6), often through the use of Scott’s weapons of
the weak (1985).
The implications here are that women at all social
levels have multiple ways to express rebellion,
resistance, and/or subversion and in fact often those
who do so may benefit more than those who
conform but once this becomes explicit rather than
remaining tacit, the likelihood of backlashes increases
(see Harris 2004).
5 Conclusion
Power relations in such a setting as this one in Mali
are multiple and complex and exist in more
dimensions than we usually consider. They also
circulate in the Foucauldian manner with all
pressures meeting with some manner and strength
of resistance, and combine the tacit and the explicit.
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In my work in Mororo, I was able to use deliberate
tactics in order to encourage the development of a
different kind of male power than that which is
established through gender relations, a kind of
power that increases men’s capacity for power
‘within’ and ‘to’, and is intended to reduce their
desire for power ‘over’.
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Notes
* I would like to thank Jethro Pettit and Rosalind
Eyben for their comments on an earlier version of
this article.
1 I want to thank Haoua Sissoko, Issa Sidibé, Ma
Koné and Abdoulaye Camara for their help with
the training in these villages, as well as Kadiatou
Gamby, Mali site coordinator, for facilitating the
work. The Integrated Pest Management
Collaborative Research Support Program (IPM
CRSP) is funded by the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID).
2 Not its real name. I have concealed the identity of
the village to protect the privacy of its inhabitants,
whose names I have also changed.
3 In Mali, individuals do not own land. Each village
has its own area, which the chief divides among
the families living there.
4 The methodology that we used to support the
men to work this through for themselves has
been called transformative learning. I describe it
at length in Harris (2006b).
5 I do not mean to suggest that all Malian NGOs
work in a hierarchical and insensitive manner.
Indeed, I have been involved with NGOs that
work in a highly sensitive and inclusive way and
which in part because of this have success.
However, according to Cheick and his friends, the
NGOs they had encountered were not of this
type.
6 According to this theory, it would be much
harder for men to use physical violence to control
their female partners if both sides acknowledged
that this was completely out of order and
inappropriate, despite the physical inequalities
that would still exist and that make it easier for
men to beat their wives than the other way
around. After all, the most powerful men in
society are not the physically strongest.
7 But, of course, rich and seemingly powerful men
are also perpetrators of the worst kinds of
domestic violence, perhaps because they do not
experience themselves as powerful, despite their
positionality.
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